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COMMANDERS DIGEST

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America's Technological Leadership Is Challenged

VISITS SAC—Vice President Spiro T. Agnew is greeted by General Bruce K. Holloway, Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command (center), and Lieutenant General Glen W. Martin, Vice CINCSAC, on arrival at Offutt AFB, Neb. The Vice President visited SAC Headquarters earlier this month for an orientation and briefing.

Dr. John S. Foster Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, told members of the National Security Industrial Association in Washington, D.C., March 12 that there is a sweeping challenge from abroad to America's technological leadership.

At the 16th Annual James Forrestal Award dinner, Dr. Foster received the James Forrestal Award, presented "to a distinguished American who has most effectively applied Mr. Forrestal's ideals to the concepts and requirements of national security." Following are excerpts of Dr. Foster's remarks:

For at least a generation, the United States has been the major world power in both military and economic terms. Since World War II, our strength has been built upon the bedrock of advanced technology.

As a nation, we started our industrial growth as the bold and versatile engineer of technological applications—in shipping, agriculture, and then in the chemical and electrical industries. In the early days, we were an importer of science. Later, we began to forge ahead in the basic sciences, often thanks to the immigration of superb scientists who sought refuge and freedom here. Recently, we have achieved most of the world's "firsts" not only in engineering but also in science.

But today, global patterns are changing. Our position of leadership is fading.

For many years now, the Soviet Union, clearly recognizing a prime source of national strength in the modern world, has

(Continued On Page Six)

Security Forces Undergoing Changes To Meet Needs Of 1970s

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird addressed the Government-Industry conference of the Electronic Industries Association in Washington March 11. Following are excerpts of his address:

I appreciate the fact that the electronic industries perform an indispensable role in providing our military forces—and those of our partners—many of the tools to support our national objectives.

May I just say in passing that I am well aware of the contributions the electronic industries are making to the development of our SAFEGUARD missile defense system. Many of the most challenging aspects of this defense have been addressed by defense contractors in your field.

As you know, the President feels that continued progress on SAFEGUARD this year—even at the minimum spending level we have recommended—will preserve future options:

—to protect land-based missiles;

—to protect our population against accidental missile launches; and,

—to protect against a light area attack such as China might be able to mount later in this decade.

In addition, the projected SAFEGUARD progress will enhance the opportunities for progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

You have my thanks for your continued, impressive technical contributions to SAFEGUARD.

The Defense Department is now in a transitional period.

(Continued On Page Two)

Security Forces Undergoing Changes To Meet Needs Of 1970s

(Continued From Page One)

Our national security forces are undergoing basic changes in order to fit the needs of our new national security strategy for the '70s.

As you know, we have made major changes in our Defense program for both the current fiscal year and for Fiscal Year 1971.

The cutback in the Defense Budget submitted for Fiscal Year 1971 may not yet be fully comprehended in some quarters.

The Defense cutback is part of the transition. John Gardner, the former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, accurately noted, some years ago, that threats to our security have many facets. There is, he said:

—The threat of universal destruction;

—The threat of poverty and ignorance;

—The threat of prejudice;

—The threat of incursions on individual freedoms; and

—The threat of mediocrity in our lives.

The Nixon Administration is attacking all of these threats. To do so requires a major realignment of priorities within the Federal Budget. Defense reductions have, therefore, been more than matched by increases in other important domestic programs.

Let me highlight just a few of the bench marks in our defense economies:

—Military and civilian manpower in the Department of Defense has been reduced sharply. Manpower cuts will total 682,000 in the two fiscal years, 1970 and 1971.

—Defense costs as a share of the Federal Budget have fallen from 41 per cent in the Johnson Budget for FY 1970 to 35 per cent for FY 1971—the lowest share in 20 years.

—Defense spending has been cut from 9.5 per cent of the Gross National Product in FY 1968 to a planned 7 per cent in FY 1971—again the lowest percentage in 20 years.



SUPERINTENDENT — Major General William A. Knowlton (right) has succeeded Major General Samuel W. Koster as the Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. Gen. Knowlton became the 49th Superintendent March 23. He had been Secretary of the Army General Staff since July 1968. He was graduated from the Academy in 1943.

. . . as further evidence of our plan to free resources for other uses, I (have) approved some 371 actions recommended by the armed services to consolidate, reduce, realign, or close defense installations. Completion of these actions will result in an annual reduction of DoD expenditures of more than $914 million. About 94,000 positions—military and civilian—will be affected. And I must frankly tell you that I expect further reductions in activities and personnel in order to meet Defense budgetary limitations.

The reasons for these reductions and cutbacks are straightforward.

First, they are possible, in part, because of the success we have had to date in our Vietnamization program. Vietnamization will have allowed us to reduce American military strength ceilings in Vietnam by more than 115,000 by April 15.

Second, the Defense realignments reflect the Nixon Administration policy of restoring national economic stability by restraint on Federal spending.

Third, the base realignments constitute a step towards increased efficiency in using Defense resources.

Fourth, the Defense reductions are a result of our desire to approach security in the broadest context. We are freeing Federal resources to help solve some of our other major domestic needs.

That, in essence, is a major part of the current transition.

I know, however, that the electronic industries are particularly concerned with the future. Your industries are facing many of the same kind of decisions on priorities and resources that we face at the Federal level. I know that you wonder just how far Defense cutbacks will go and what their effects will be on your planning.

I would remind you first of President Nixon's words in his Foreign Policy Report:

> *"Defense spending is of course in a special category. It must never fall short of the minimum needed for security. If it does, the problem of domestic programs may become moot."*

We simply cannot make progress toward peace in the world by creating a weak America.

Negotiation without a foundation of strength is a pathway to failure. We must not fail in the era of negotiation ahead. Therefore, while striving for balance among our various national goals, we must provide the essentials for a strong military posture. I want to repeat for you what I stated to the Congress and the American people in my Defense Report. That is that the Defense Budget now before Congress is an austere, rock bottom, barebones budget.

Planning to meet the security problems of the 1970s is an increasingly difficult task. Part of the problem, as I have indicated, is to devise an appropriate allocation of the future resources devoted to Defense. Besides the external pressures on

Secretary of Defense Laird

Defense spending, however, we face complex problems in deriving a proper balance among our military programs.

One of the costs of Vietnam has been the postponement of an orderly modernization of major portions of our armed forces. There has been a postponement of development or deployment of new aircraft, new missiles, and new tanks. We are likewise concerned about the growing obsolescence of our naval forces.

Because of past postponements we are faced now with a modernization deficit.

Obviously, we cannot correct all the consequences of delayed modernization in one or two years. What we are doing now is making careful and selective decisions on what our forces will look like in the future. I can assure you that we shall be needing your help to keep our forces, whatever their structure, properly equipped.

Another facet illustrating the complexity in structuring balanced forces for the future derives from the Nixon Doctrine. An essential element of the Nixon Doctrine is an increasing emphasis on pursuing peace through partnership with—and contribution by—our allies.

This new policy requires that we place more emphasis on making available to our allies appropriate military equipment. Let me emphasize the word "appropriate." The weapons that are appropriate for American forces are not necessarily the same ones appropriate for some of our allies. For example, the Air Force just a few days ago requested proposals for the potential development of an International Fighter. This fighter—in concept to be less complex and less expensive than those for our own forces—could provide a means for some of our allies to shoulder more of the defense burden. We need to have equipment available which will be better suited to our allies' requirements. This will call for continued imagination, innovation, and participation on the part of our defense-related industries.

Looking to the future, let me mention another key goal of the Nixon Administration that promises to reshape our military forces; that is the orderly movement to reduce draft calls to zero. The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, chaired by former Defense Secretary Thomas Gates, has completed a careful study of this problem. The Commission's work is consistent with many of the actions we at the Department of Defense have already taken this past year through our Project Volunteer Committee.

I want my position on the report of the Gates Commission to be very clear. I have read stories that I have criticized the report and that I am opposed to it. That is not true. I subscribe to the President's statement on March 27, 1969, when he announced the creation of the Gates Commission. At that time the President said:

> *"The transition to an All-Volunteer Force must, of course, be handled cautiously and responsibly so that our national security is fully maintained."*

I believe there are traps and pitfalls in making many kinds of forecasts. I have refused to make flat, specific predictions about Vietnam. I make none for a zero draft call at an early date. I feel such predictions have caused past credibility problems for the Department of Defense. I have tried, instead, to level with Americans—to be a realist, rather than an optimist or a pessimist.

This view should not be misconstrued to mean that we at Defense do not support the move toward less reliance on the draft. The fact is that we not only support it but that we are developing plans and taking actions to make it a reality. We feel that progress must be made towards a zero draft call, as the President has stated in a responsible way. That means our national security always is maintained.

All of you here know also that to achieve peace with security we must remain in the forefront of advancing technology. We must keep abreast of technical advances that could magnify the effectiveness of our weapons and forces. This is all the more important in a period of tightening budget limitations.

We count on a vigorous research and development program to keep our technological base healthy and responsive. In the long run, nothing could be more detrimental to our future national security than neglect of our technological base.

We, therefore, are sensitive to actions which may reduce that base. We continue to provide strong budgetary support for our Defense R&D effort.

There are two legislative actions which cause us concern in this regard. One is a bill still under consideration by the Senate which would prohibit the reimbursement of cost for independent research and development under negotiated contracts, except under certain conditions. Those conditions are that the costs have been specifically provided for in the contract and are of direct or indirect benefit to the work performed under that specific contract. While I understand the concern of the Congress, I believe such restrictions would unnecessarily stifle new and imaginative efforts. The result would be to reduce the technological effectiveness of our defense-related industries. We are continuing an intensive re-examination of this matter and are working with the Congress to clarify the potential

(Continued On Page Seven)

The Earth Resources Satellite Program

Cooperation In Outer Space

In the process of exploring the peaceful uses of outer space, the U.S. is currently conducting an experimental Earth Resources Satellite Program and hopes to launch its first satellite in 1972.

The goal of this remarkable program is to obtain significant new information about the earth's resources which could enable man to manage those resources and to improve the quality of the word's environment. Recently William B. Buffum, U.S. Representative at the U.N., described the program for members of the U.N. Political and Security Committee. Following are excerpts from his statement.

This has been a year of achievement in the exploration of outer space. But such technical accomplishments as the Apollo 11 and 12 lunar landings and the televising of the surface of Mars are not the only successes to which one should look. There are other peaceful uses of space which offer the promise of practical returns for the development of our societies.

I am referring in particular to the still-experimental earth resources satellite program which the United States is currently exploring. Indeed, President Nixon used this program to illustrate his declaration to the General Assembly that the U.S. would share the benefits as well as the adventures of space. The President, you may recall, pledged that our earth resources satellite program, as it proceeds and fulfills its promise, "will be dedicated to produce information not only for the United States but also for the world community."

For a number of years we have been exploring the potential of various remote sensing techniques for such practical uses as aiding in identifying areas of crop diseases, locating mineral deposits, and surveying forests, rangelands, vegetation, soils, river basins, and ground water. We have analyzed the data obtained from our meteorological and advanced technology satellites for the information they provide on snow cover, ice floes, and ocean currents. We have studied the color photographs taken during the Gemini and Apollo flights for the broad range of data they contain, and we continue to publish the results.

The purpose of the experimental earth resources satellite program will be to determine the desirability and configuration of an operational space-based earth resources survey system and the problems associated with handling data from such a system. We are now defining the specific experimental objectives and character of the first two earth resources technology satellites, the first of which we hope to be able to launch sometime in 1972.

Our earth resources technology satellite program will mark the first attempt to obtain earth resources data through telemetry. In testing the capabilities of this first earth resources technology satellite, we will concentrate primarily on test sites in the United States about which a considerable body of ground truth data and knowledge is being acquired. We will make this data available and the test sites open to the world scientific community. This will help us to consider together our common interests in developing these survey techniques.

Cooperative Programs Already Initiated

At the same time that we are exploring the extent of our program's future utility we are endeavoring to provide other nations with ample opportunity to judge for themselves the practical applications of remote sensing of earth resources.

The U.S. has initiated cooperative programs with Mexico and Brazil concerning the techniques and prospects for earth resources surveys. . . . We in the U.S. shall be happy to offer technical guidance, as well as training opportunities, to member states who may wish to pursue aircraft-based sensing programs on either a national or regional basis. We are already helping India to set up its own experiment to identify areas of coconut palm blight through airborne remote sensing techniques.

'We will make this data available and the test sites open to the world scientific community.'

On the satellite side, we have provided the Secretary General with a detailed description of the earth resources survey program of NASA and have asked that copies be made available in the U.N. Outer Space Affairs Division for study by interested states.

Other U.S. actions to date include: joint development with Canada of an absorption spectrometer for earth resources ap-



William B. Buffum

plications; the broad international circulation of relevant studies and documents, together with examples of Gemini and Apollo terrain photography; our active participation in U.N.-sponsored earth resources survey sessions at the 1968 U.N. Space Conference in Vienna and more recently in earth resources symposia held in Argentina, France, and the United Kingdom; and our support for the international biological program.

Last October, at the invitation of the United States through the Secretary General, 41 experts from 12 countries took advantage of the International Symposium on Remote Sensing of Environment at the University of Michigan. We shall continue to inform other nations of such technical conferences as they are scheduled.

Proposals For Future Action

The President mentioned in September that we would be putting before the U.N. several proposals with regard to the use of earth resources satellites for the world community. . . . : We shall convene an international workshop on earth resources survey systems in the spring of 1971. . . . We shall expand NASA's international fellowship program (now under way) to include courses at U.S. universities on the fundamentals of remote sensing. . . . We shall provide briefings and exhibits on earth resources surveying for U.N. members, the Secretariat, and specialized agency representatives, as well as arrange for visits to the data facility and the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston and other U.S. facilities where remote sensing work is being conducted.

In particular, we are inviting members of the U.N. Outer Space Committee and staff of the specialized agencies dealing with resources information and management to visit the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center for a briefing on the NASA earth resources survey program and to inspect the facilities and data bank there.

We plan . . . also to invite potential international users to work with us as we explore, from the standpoint of their needs and problems, the best ways of approaching such technically difficult matters as data processing, interpretation, and utilization. In this way the international community will be able to draw directly on our experience.

It seems to us that all member states should give thought to practical mechanisms which might be considered in the future to facilitate further international cooperation in this field. For example, governments may wish to consider the establishment of a central data facility or center to serve the U.N. family already active in the resources field, and they may wish to consider regional arrangements for processing and distributing data.

'The ultimate result could be a major contribution to the solution of a number of the earth's food, water, and other resources problems.'

A Major Contribution

In conclusion, remote sensing by satellite and aircraft offers not only significant promise of assisting in the acquisition of significant new information about resources but opens the door for the first time to a means by which a regular inventory of resources might be taken, thus permitting us to manage our resources to a degree far beyond anything previously thought attainable. The ultimate result, therefore, could be a major contribution to the solution of a number of the earth's food, water, and other resources problems, including the improvement of environmental quality.

We are consulting various interested members of the Outer Space Committee with a view to submitting a proposal which would invite member states with experience in this field to make such experience available to other member states.

Finally, we would request the Outer Space Committee to continue its studies regarding the possibilities of further international cooperation. This could constitute an important first step toward an exploration together of the potential of remote earth resources surveying.

These are preliminary suggestions and comments. We look forward to learning the views of others, and we hope that our mutual consideration of these views, as President Nixon stated in his address to the General Assembly, will "be marked not by rivalry but by the same spirit of fraternal cooperation that has so long been the hallmark of the international community of science."

America's Technological Leadership Is Challenged

(Continued From Page One)

emphasized research and development. Soviet expenditures for defense, space, and atomic energy technology have grown until they now exceed ours. Soviet efforts continue to expand rapidly. Our effort has leveled off and begun to decline.

In civilian technology—particularly in the manufacture of technologically intensive products—Japan, West Germany and others have achieved and sustained a growth rate several times ours for more than a decade. In selected areas we no longer lead. We follow. No reversal of this trend is in sight.

One indicator is a comparison of total national research and development efforts. Here the Soviet Union is clearly our strongest competitor. Ten years ago, our total funding for research and development, public and private, was almost twice that of the Soviet Union. Today the U.S. total is only some 20 per cent greater. By the mid-1970s the trends would put us in second position.

If we compare the efforts of the two countries in terms of technical manpower, we find that the Soviet Union over the past 15 years increased the rate at which it graduated engineers by a factor of almost four—and brought its rate to six times ours. In terms of graduating scientists, the U.S. still retains a substantial lead, however,—a rate twice that of the Soviet Union.

Over-all, the U.S. and the Soviet Union now have roughly the same number of full-time scientists and engineers engaged in research and development. However, if present trends persist, by the mid-1980s the Soviet Union will have a total R&D force one-third larger than ours.

I am concerned about this impressive Soviet commitment to the expansion of their technical manpower, even though I recognize that we probably train and use our technical people more effectively.

The Soviet Union is clearly creating a national research and development base larger than ours. Furthermore, we know that the Soviets can use their people and their money effectively when they want to. There is no dodging these facts.

It is disquieting to realize that Soviet defense-related research and development efforts are already more than 20 per cent larger than ours. More alarming is the rate at which their efforts are still increasing. The Soviet Union achieved its new position after a decade of growth at the average annual rate of about 10-13 per cent per year. Measured in constant purchasing power, our own efforts have, in fact, declined in the past few years.

In assessing the quality of Soviet defense-related research and development, I can give you two judgments. First, the United States retains a clear but narrowing over-all technical lead. But second, the Soviet Union already has the resources and the advanced technology required for a vigorous challenge to the United States in many areas.

The trend is grim—grim because we Americans have enjoyed a well-founded confidence in our ability to meet any challenge in defense, in atomic energy and in space. In the past, our confidence has sprung from our scientific and technological leadership. The unavoidable question is: which country will be the more confident in the 1970s and 1980s?

Dr. Foster . . . "A nation's vigor in science and technology determines its success in commerce, welfare and security."

I would like to emphasize six essential ways to maintain technological leadership in the service of our national goals. I raise these points in the spirit of President Kennedy's warning in his first State of the Union message. He said:

"I speak today in an hour of national peril and national opportunity. Before my term has ended we shall have to test anew whether a nation organized and governed such as ours can endure. The outcome is by no means certain."

I hope the following six points may make that outcome more certain.

First, we must limit our goals and adopt only the most essential. Through President Nixon's Vietnamization program, we are winding down our participation in the war in Vietnam. Through the new National Security Council machinery, we are clarifying our priorities in military and foreign policies. Through further stern analysis of our economic position, we can integrate and better utilize our civilian-technology activities to meet domestic needs and international markets. Through fiscal restraint, we must stop the inflationary spiral.

The country's research and development program will increasingly reflect this searching reorder of our priorities.

Second, we must pursue an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. What we seek in Vienna makes sense: to reduce uncertainties in the strategic balance; to create greater assurance in avoiding world nuclear war; and, frankly, to the extent the arms talks succeed, we can permit both countries to make greater investments in domestic programs.

Third, we must cut the over-all costs of the Defense Depart-

ment, without assuming unacceptably greater risks. We will modify our missions and reevaluate our commitments—so that we can reduce forces and do our full part to curb inflation and release resources to the civilian sector. More will be done along this line than has been accomplished so far, but less can be done than some observers wishfully hope.

Fourth, we must revamp—and thoroughly—the design philosophy in every corner of the Defense Department and defense industry. This task falls within my responsibilities—and there is no other matter about which I feel more strongly. We shall not in the future indulge in the present syndrome of incorporating into every system the most advanced technology, as soon as it seems to be available or merely because it is advanced. We shall ask only for what we really need—the minimum necessary performance—and we shall match, wherever possible, proven technology to that essential, realistic need.

We shall insist relentlessly—as a point without peer in our management—that price has as much priority as performance. This does not rule out vigorous pursuit of new technology where that technology is required or can pay its way. And frequently, new technology can be used to reduce costs. Yet we must design-to-a-price, a much lower price, or else we will not be able to afford what we need. Defense budgets are going down. The costs of what we need, just our essential needs, are going up. Our only solution is to make cost a principal design parameter. This is how we must now define what is "best." We have no other choice.

You have heard such assertions before. But we have made and you have made far too few changes. Now we must adopt the fundamental reforms that will affect every designer, every officer, every specification-writer throughout the Defense Department and throughout industry.

Fifth, and a crucial point today, we must use national technology more wisely—and in that way maximize the benefits and minimize the adverse side-effects of technology. The quality of life, nationally and internationally, depends in fact upon the quality of the management of technology. This is what President Nixon pointed out in his State of the Union Message when he said: *"America, which has pioneered in the new abundance, and in the new technology, is called upon today to pioneer in meeting the concerns which have followed in their wake—in turning the wonders of science to the service of man."*

Sixth and last. To help us maintain technological leadership and national security in the long-range future, we must spend now at substantial levels on basic and applied research—even given our current fiscal constraints. We cannot permit our technological wellsprings to dry up.

To accomplish these six tasks will not be easy. Yet, if we do not work hard on these six challenges, the American people are going to be in deepening trouble.

Without technological leadership, there will be greater erosion of our economic strength and greater jeopardy to our goals at home.

To default on technical leadership will be to accept ever greater risks to our national security. And without this security all else is theoretical musing or vain hope.

Security Forces Changes Made To Meet Strategy Needs Of '70s

(Continued From Page Three)

impact of this legislation. I deeply appreciate the parallel efforts of your association in that regard.

The other legislative action is the recently-enacted Section 203 of the FY 1970 Military Procurement Authorization Act. Section 203 provides that Department of Defense R&D funds may not be used for projects unless they have a "direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function or operation."

We are complying with that requirement.

However, I am concerned about the broader implications of Section 203 for the over-all level of basic research in the United States. As you know, it is particularly difficult to identify in advance the ultimate applications of basic research. If Section 203 means that every researcher must declare in advance some military application to his effort in order to obtain defense funding, this would tend to discourage talented scientists from potentially productive research areas.

Let me re-emphasize the need to continue an excellent and imaginative defense research and development program. We must not cripple either the productive industrial base or the vigorous industrial and academic research base which has evolved over the years. We cannot settle for anything short of technological leadership in research and development.

In summary, the nation is in a transitional period. We are reshaping our defense forces to meet the needs of the 1970s. We are currently reducing our Defense manpower and budget in a major effort to free resources for other pressing domestic problems. We are making a searching review of our national priorities and are working towards a more optimum allocation of our resources.

In this process we will keep America strong. The continuing contribution of the electronics and other defense-related industries remains an essential foundation for that strength. We cannot build a lasting peace without the technology and industrial capacity you represent.

I would, in closing, like to add one last note. I referred earlier to John Gardner's outlines of the security threats we face. The corollary to the threats, as he outlined them, was that to achieve real and enduring security, we must keep certain ideals alive. That requires leadership—not just by the President, or by the Department of Defense, or by associations like yours. Rather, it requires leadership, and a renewed sense of responsibility, on the part of each of us as individuals.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Defense Secretary Laird Gives Assessment Of Situation In Laos

As Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird emphashized on March 19 that his interest in Laos "goes to my responsibility to protect the safety and security of Americans that are serving there in South Vietnam."

He continued, "it is important to their safety and their security that we continue to do the best possible job of interdicting supplies and personnel as they move through Laos. I will continue to recommend that we carry on as effective an interdiction campaign as we possibly can in that area in order to limit the amount of supplies, and ammunition and personnel that will come in contact with American forces in the South. That's my major concern as far as Laos is concerned."

At a Pentagon briefing, Secretary Laird gave these views on the situation in Laos:

"From the standpoint of the movement of the North Vietnamese across the country, there has been an increase as you know of military presence of the North Vietnamese in the last few months in Laos—and they have very great freedom of movement in Laos at the present time—but this is not anything new. This has been going on ever since the 1962 Accords. During the rainy period, particularly the Meo tribesmen, under Gen. Vang Pao, have been able to move in the Plain area—the central part of Laos. They have been moving back each year as the North Vietnamese move out once again. The situation from the standpoint of the Royal Laotian forces and the forces of the Meo tribe is not a good military situation. This has not been a very good situation at any time since 1962. . ."

Q—What effect would any Communist takeover in Laos have on our efforts in Vietnam?

A—Since the bombing halt and the so-called understanding, the flow of material and goods, as well as personnel, has been through Laos, rather than through any section of the DMZ. Because under the understanding at the time of the bombing halt, it was agreed—it was understood. I want to be truthful about this, because I'm not using the term "agreement." It's understood they would not use the DMZ for infiltration of major military personnel units or for supplies and logistic support.

Thus far, there have been violations of the DMZ, but they have not been of a major nature. They have been of small scope and so the DMZ, as the understanding is, has been fairly well observed. I don't want to say there haven't been any violations because that isn't true. There have been some, but it is not a major source of supplies or personnel. The shift has come over around the DMZ and they've used the avenue into Laos and around for their personnel and for the major portion of their logistics support in the South. So the use of Laos by the North Vietnamese does have a considerable effect upon the safety and security of American forces in South Vietnam. My interest, as Secretary of Defense, in Laos goes to my responsibility to protect the safety and security of Americans that are serving there in South Vietnam . . .

Q—Sir, wouldn't we have a a rather delicate international situation if the Communists took over Laos and told us to stop bombing in Laos and we continued? Wouldn't we have a legal . . . .

A—It might be a difficult situation, but I just want to make it clear that as far as I'm concerned, as Secretary of Defense, I'll recommend we continue.

Q—When our troops are out of South Vietnam, is the interdiction going to continue to protect the safety and security of the South Vietnamese troops?

A—The interdiction of supplies?

Q—The interdiction of supplies from Laos into South Vietnam?

A—I would think that the interdiction campaign would be very important. One of the best means of interdiction has been the use of the gunship and we are giving the highest priority in our Vietnamization program, as far as the South Vietnamese Air Force is concerned in the Phase II program, to giving them that capability. That's why we've increased our air Vietnamization program, stepped it up. We're in Phase II of that already.

Phase I of the Vietnamization program dealt with the combat responsibility in-country. Phase II dealt with the logistics, air support and fire support, and we are already working on that Phase II program to give them capabilities in this area. I think it's most important that the South Vietnamese forces acquire this kind of a capability.

SECNAV VISIT—Rear Admiral M. D. Carmody (left), Commander Carrier Division One, welcomes Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee aboard the USS Bon Homme Richard. Secretary Chafee visited the attack carrier during an official tour of West Coast naval vessels and shore installations. Bon Homme Richard was involved in an exercise with more than 40 U.S. ships and aircraft squadrons as well as three Canadian vessels from Esquimalt, British Columbia. In center is Captain John F. Davis, Chief of Staff Carrier Division One.

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